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Abstract. Using insights from parametric integer linear programming,
we significantly improve on our previous work [Proc. ACM EC 2019]
on high-multiplicity fair allocation. Therein, answering an open ques-
tion from previous work, we proved that the problem of finding envy-
free Pareto-efficient allocations of indivisible items is fixed-parameter
tractable with respect to the combined parameter “number of agents”
plus “number of item types.” Our central improvement, compared to this
result, is to break the condition that the corresponding utility and mul-
tiplicity values have to be encoded in unary required there. Concretely,
we show that, while preserving fixed-parameter tractability, these values
can be encoded in binary, thus greatly expanding the range of feasible
values.
Keywords: Fixed-parameter tractability · Fixed dimension · Fair divi-
sion · Efficient envy-free allocation · Indivisible items.
1 Introduction
Fairly allocating (indivisible) items [9] is a key issue in a world of limited re-
sources. For instance, this is reflected by popular tools such as the Adjusted
Winner Procedure, the web platform spliddit.org [17], or application contexts
such as food-banks [28]. In this work, we significantly strengthen our previous
work [11] in this direction by extending the application domain of an algorithmic
result for “high-multiplicity fair allocation” based on mathematical programming
tools. To this end, note that the focus of our work is on provably fair allocations.
To understand important facets of our research contribution, let us become
more precise on the studied problem. We consider a set of item types, each
coming with the number of actual items of this type, and a set of agents who
report their utilities over each item type. An allocation of items is an assignment
of disjoint sets of the items, called bundles, to the agents. One of the most
prominent fairness concepts is envy-freeness. It considers an allocation as fair if
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there is no agent that would prefer a bundle of any other agent over her own one.
However, it is trivial to achieve envy-freeness by giving every agent an empty
bundle. To circumvent this issue, several “efficiency” measures of allocations
have been proposed. A very important one, Pareto-efficiency, requires that for
an efficient allocation there exists no other allocation that is preferred by at least
one agent while, at the same time, does not make any agent worse off. Putting all
this together, we end up with so-called “envy-free Pareto-efficient allocations,”
which are the focus of our studies.
Finding envy-free Pareto-efficient allocations, however, is a computationally
very hard problem. For instance, the corresponding decision problem is ΣP2 -
complete for general utilities [10] and even for (positive) additive utilities [21]—
indeed, the latter is the model we study in our work. Notably, the scenario we
study is also an important part of the web platform spliddit.org. Formally, the
key problem of the paper is the following.
Input: A set A of n agents, a set I of m item types, agent utilities
ua : I → Z for every a ∈ A, and item multiplicities mi ∈ N for
each i ∈ I.
Question: Is there an envy-free Pareto-efficient allocation?
EEF–Allocation
In previous work, Bliem et al. [8] left open3 whether EEF–Allocation is
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the (combined) parameter n+m. This
was answered partially positively (with the restriction of unary encoded item
multiplicities and utilities) in our recent work [11]. Now, we further improve on
this by relaxing the constraint of unary encoded item multiplicities and utilities
thereby allowing binary encodings. This greatly expands the range of values
we can deal with efficiently in the practically relevant case of small numbers
of agents (n) and items types (m). To this end, we make use of insights from
parametric integer linear programming.
1.1 Related Work
We give a brief overview on the most relevant related work splitting in into two
parts organized thematically.
Efficient and Envy-free Allocations of Indivisible Resources. Bouveret and
Lang [10] were the first studying the computational complexity of computing
Pareto-efficient and envy-free allocations of indivisible items in a systematic way.
Their findings include ΣP2 -completeness for so-called monotonic dichotomous
3 Technically, the open question was formulated for the parameter n + udiff, where
udiff denotes the number of different values in the utility functions. This parameter
can easily be seen to be equivalent to our parameter n+m in terms of fixed-parameter
tractability. Note that Bliem et al. [8] used the variable name m for the number of
items and showed fixed-parameter tractability for this parameter.
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preferences as well as NP-hardness and polynomial-time solvable for several spe-
cial cases. Most relevant to our setting with additive utility-based preferences,
they showed that even if there are just two agents or if every agent assigns either
utility value 0 or 1 to each item, the problem of finding a Pareto-efficient and
envy-free allocation remains NP-hard. Moreover, de Keijzer et al. [21] showed
that ΣP2 -completeness even holds for positive additive preferences. Bliem et
al. [8] analyzed the parameterized complexity, showing that the problem becomes
tractable for the parameter “number of items” and various special settings but
remains intractable for the parameter “number of agents.”
Multiple approaches have been developed to relax fairness concepts in order
to circumvent computational intractability as well as possible non-existence of
Pareto-efficient and envy-free allocations. For instance, Lipton et al. [24] con-
sidered the concept of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). Herein, every agent
compares its bundle with the bundles of all other agents and she is envious if any
other bundle minus the most valuable item in there is better than her own bundle.
Further studied concepts include envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) [14,25],
minimum envy [24], group envy-freeness, group Pareto-efficiency [2], or graph
envy-freeness [1,7,12]; Amanatidis et al. [3] provide a comparison of approximate
or relaxed fairness notions.
Barman et al. [6] developed an algorithm that computes an allocation that
is Pareto-efficient and EF1 with pseudo-polynomial running time (being polyno-
mial in the number of agents, the number of items, and the maximum utility).
Caragiannis et al. [14] showed how to compute an allocation that maximizes
Nash welfare and thus yields Pareto-efficiency and EF1. While a round-robin al-
location of items can be used to obtain a complete EF1 allocation in polynomial
time when all items have positive utilities, Aziz et al. [4] have argued that this
procedure fails when items may have negative utilities. Leaving the complexity
of computing Pareto-efficient and EF1 allocation (when negative utilities are
allowed) open, they showed that a complete EF1 allocation can be found in
polynomial time.
Parametric ILP applications. Eisenbrand and Shmonin [16, Theorem 4.2] gave
an algorithm that, if the number of variables is fixed, solves the given instance
of Parametric ILP (PILP) in polynomial time. To the best of our knowledge,
Crampton et al. [15, Corollary 2.2] were the first to give an “interpretation” of
the result of Eisenbrand and Shmonin [16] in terms of parameterized complexity
analysis. More specifically, they showed membership in the complexity class FPT,
that is, they showed a running time f(p, n)·|I| for an instance I of PILP provided
that the coefficients of the matrix A are encoded in unary. Using this result
Crampton et al. [15] initiated the parameterized study of the so-called resiliency
problems (such as the Resiliency Closest String problem).
Knop et al. [22] used the interpretation of Crampton et al. [15] to solve
a decade-long-standing open question of FPT-membership of a variant of the
Bribery problem in the field of elections manipulation. Recently, Bredereck et
al. [11] also used the interpretation of Crampton et al. [15] in the context of fair
allocation. More specifically, they showed [11, Corollary 5] that finding a fair and
4 Bredereck et al.
efficient allocation is fixed-parameter tractable for few agents and few item types.
The result holds for numerous different concepts of fairness and efficiency. Yet,
their result holds only when the maximum utility value an agent assigns to an
item type and item multiplicities are encoded in unary. As we shall shortly see,
we are improving upon this result by allowing item multiplicities to be encoded
in binary.
1.2 Our Contribution
In Section 2, we present an interpretation of Theorem 4.2 of Eisenbrand and
Shmonin [16] (which is a bit more detailed than the one provided by Crampton
et al. [15]). More specifically, we observe that it is possible to derive a certificate
of infeasibility of a given PILP sentence. This inspired us to work with a com-
plementary problem, since when doing so we derive a (membership) certificate
for the original problem. To this end, in Section 3, we model nonexistence of a
solution to the EEF–Allocation problem as an instance of PILP. That is, the
sentence we describe expresses that “every envy-free allocation is dominated.”
It is worth pointing out that if such a sentence is not valid, then the certifi-
cate (right-hand side) is a Pareto-efficient allocation, since it is not possible to
dominate it. The combination of the two yields the following strengthening of
Corollary 5 in our previous work [11] for the EEF–Allocation problem. No-
tably, our previous model was based on the big-M method, used essentially for
the negation present in the model (to describe that a certain collection of im-
proving steps cannot be applied to the given allocation), which we avoid here.
The main contribution of this paper is to prove the following.
Theorem 1. Let I be an instance of the EEF–Allocation problem with
umax = 2
o(log |I|). Then, there is an algorithm that decides I in f(m+n)·poly(|I|)
time, for some computable function f : N→ N.
We remark that our technique also applies to other variants of EEF–
Allocation where we replace envy-freeness or Pareto-efficiency by related con-
cepts. We refer to the conclusion (Section 4) for a discussion about further ap-
plications.
2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer n, by [n] we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use boldface let-
ters for vectors (e.g. x,y) and for a vector x in dimension n we denote with xi its
i-th coordinate for i ∈ [n]. For two vectors x and y in dimension, respectively, nx
and ny, vector (x,y) is an (nx+ny)-dimensional vector (x1, . . . , xnx , y1, . . . , yny).
A polyhedron is an intersection of half-spaces, that is, a set {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b}.
A partially open polyhedron is an intersection of half-spaces and open half-spaces,
that is, a set {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b, A¯x < b¯}.
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2.1 Allocations, Envy-Freeness, and Pareto-Efficiency
Consider n agents a1, . . . , an, a set I of m item types, and multiplicities mi for
each i ∈ I. An allocation pi is an integral (n · m)-dimensional vector pi =(
π1a1 , . . . , π
1
an , π
2
a1 , . . . , π
m
an
)
, i.e., for each agent the number of items she gets
of every item type. For each agent a ∈ A, let ua : I → Z be the agent’s utility
function. We assume the preferences of the agents to be additive, that is, the
utility value for a set of items is the sum of the items utility values. Thus, we
define the satisfaction of agent a from allocation pi as
∑
i∈I ua(i)π
i
a; for brevity,
we delicately abuse the notation and denote it by ua(pi). We formally describe
envy-freeness and Pareto-efficiency as follows.
Definition 1. Let A be a set of n agents, I be a set of m item types with
multiplicities mi for each item type i ∈ I, and pi be an allocation of the items to
the agents in A.
An allocation pi is envy-free if there is no pair {a, a′} of agents such
that ua(pi) <
∑
i∈I ua(i)π
i
a′ .
An allocation pi is Pareto-dominated if there exists another allocation pi′
such that for every agent a ∈ A it holds that ua(pi
′) ≥ ua(pi) and for at least
one agent the inequality is strict. An allocation is Pareto-efficient if it is not
Pareto-dominated.
2.2 Parameterized Complexity
A parameterized problem’s input consists of an instance I and a parameter
value k; the task is to decide whether (I, k) is a yes-instance. We say that a
parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to k (belongs to
the class FPT) if there is an algorithm deciding (I, k) in f(k) · poly(|I|) time,
where |I| is the size of the input and f(k) is an arbitrary computable function
of parameter k. The following proposition will come handy later.
Proposition 1 ([18, Lemma 3.10]). For every two computable functions
g : N → N and h : N → N with g(n) = o(log(n)), there exists a computable
function f : N→ N such that for every k and n we have 2g(n)h(k) ≤ f(k) · n.
2.3 Parametric Integer Programming in Fixed Dimension
For a rational polyhedron Q ⊆ Qm+p, the integer projection of Q, denoted
by Q/Zp, is a collection of all vectors b ∈ Rm for which there exists an integral
vector z ∈ Zp such that (b, z) ∈ Q. Thus, formally
Q/Zp := {b ∈ Qm : (b, z) ∈ Q for some z ∈ Zp} .
Parametric Integer Programming (PILP) is the following problem. Given a
matrix A ∈ Qm×n and a rational polyhedron Q ⊆ Qm+p, decide if for all vectors
b ∈ Qm in the integer projection of Q, the system of inequalities Ax ≤ b has an
integral solution. In other words, one has to decide the validity of the sentence
∀b ∈ Q/Zp ∃x ∈ Zn : Ax ≤ b . (PILP)
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The PILP problem is complete for the class Πp2 [27,29]. However, extend-
ing the (to the best of our knowledge) pioneering works of Kannan [19,20] on
efficient algorithms for PILP, Eisenbrand and Shmonin [16, Theorem 4.1 and
Theorem 4.2] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for PILP for the fixed number
of variables and dimension n. An analysis of their algorithm leads to the following
Proposition 2; we discuss the details afterwards.
Proposition 2. There is an algorithm deciding the sentence (PILP) in
f(m,n, p) · φh(n) · poly(L)
time, where φ is the size (encoding length) of any column in A, L is the encoding
length of the sentence and (the description of) the polyhedron Q, and f and h
are computable functions. Moreover, if the sentence (PILP) is not valid, then a
certificate b ∈ Q is provided (i.e., Ax ≤ b has no integral solution with such
a b).
Proposition 2 essentially coincides with a known result [16, Theorem 4.2]
but for the sake of completeness we discuss its proof here. First, we make sure
(using Fourier-Motzkin) that for all b ∈ Q the system Ax ≤ b has a fractional
solution; if not, then such a b is reported. In order to do so, one has to solve
f ′(m,n) many mixed ILPs in dimension p using Lenstra’s celebrated result [23]
in pO(p) poly(L) time. Second, we partition the polyhedron Q into t partially
open polyhedrons Si with the constant t due to Eisenbrand and Shmonin [16,
Theorem 4.1], that is,
t = O
((
m2nφn−1
)nω¯(n))
= f ′′(m,n) · φh(n) ,
where ω¯(n) = Πni=1ω(n), ω(n) is the constant from the flatness theorem (the cur-
rent best value is ω(n) = O(n3/2) [5]), and h(n) = n(n− 1) · ω¯(n). Due to Eisen-
brand and Shmonin [16, Theorem 4.1] each Si = S
′
i/Z
ℓi , where ℓi = O(ω¯(n)). It
also gives ki = f
′′′(n) transformations Tij for j ∈ [ki] and i ∈ [t]. Now, for any
b ∈ Si there is an integral point in the polyhedron Pb = {x : Ax ≤ b} if and
only if Tij(b) ∈ Pb for some j ∈ [ki]. The negation of this condition is then veri-
fied using a mixed ILP (for each i ∈ [t]) with (ki+1)n+ ℓi+ p integral variables.
Again, if the sentence (PILP) is not valid, then one of the above mixed ILPs
is feasible; thus, providing the certificate b. It follows that the above sketched
algorithm runs in f(m,n, p) · φh(n) · poly(L) time.
3 Finding EEF–Allocations via PILP
In this section we show how to use Proposition 2 to solve the EEF–Allocation
problem for the (combined) parameter the number of agents and item types
efficiently. From now on, we refer to the number of agents as n and to the
number of item types as m.
As already mentioned, we show the FPT-membership of EEF–Allocation
for the parameter n + m by constructing a (PILP) sentence deciding whether
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every envy-free allocation of the given collection of items is dominated by some
other allocation. The high-level idea is as follows. For the constructed (PILP)
sentence, the polyhedron Q describes all envy-free allocations. In fact, the poly-
hedron also contains additional, technical parts needed later when we want to
have Ax ≤ b if the allocation x dominates the allocation z for which we have
(b, z) ∈ Q. In the proof we show how to design a proper polyhedron Q. We be-
gin the description from the latter point, as it will give us the intuition how the
polyhedron Q should look like. Recall that an allocation x consists of entries xai ,
for each agent a and item type i, with the meaning “we give xia items of item
type i to agent a.”
Dominating an Allocation. Let z be an allocation such that (b, z) ∈ Q. We
want to design a matrix A so that Ax ≤ b if and only if x is an allocation that
dominates z.
∑
a∈A
xai ≤ mi ∀i ∈ I (1)
xai ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ I (2)
It is not hard to see that x satisfies (1) and (2) if and only if x is a valid
allocation. Thus, it remains to check that x dominates z. One can check this
with the following system of inequalities (i.e., here we allow ourselves to use the
vector z which we later replace with b).
∑
i∈I
ua(i) · x
a
i ≥
∑
i∈I
ua(i) · z
a
i ∀a ∈ A (3)
∑
a∈A
∑
i∈I
ua(i) · x
a
i ≥ 1 +
∑
a∈A
∑
i∈I
ua(i) · z
a
i (4)
Again, we observe that x dominates z if and only if it satisfies (3) and (4). Note
that (3) ensure that the total utility of an agent a in the allocation x is at least
as good as in the allocation z. Furthermore, given that condition (4) ensures
that there is at least one agent a for whom it holds that
∑
i∈I ua(i) · x
a
i >∑
i∈I ua(i) · z
a
i .
The polyhedron Q. Given the conditions (1)–(4) we want to design the poly-
hedron Q. Note that we have b ∈ Qm+mn+n+1 and, since we have z ∈ Zmn,
we get Q ⊆ Qm+2mn+n+1. We split the vector b = (b1,b2,b3, b4) according to
the group of inequalities above (i.e.,b1 is the vector of right-hand sides for the
conditions (1) and so forth). Observe that we need
b1 =m and b2 = 0 , (5)
where m is the vector of item multiplicities. Clearly, if we now use the above-
defined b1 and b2 substituting the right-hand sides of, respectively, conditions (1)
and (2), the meaning of conditions (1) and (2) remains the same (i.e., they still
encode the fact that x is an allocation).
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What remains to find out is the vector b3 and the value of b4. To achieve this,
we first ensure that z is an envy-free allocation and then derive b3 and b4 from
this analysis. The following conditions ensure that z is an envy-free allocation.
∑
a∈A
zai ≤ mi ∀i ∈ I (6)
zai ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ I (7)∑
i∈I
ua(i) · z
a
i ≥
∑
i∈I
ua(i) · z
a′
i ∀a, a
′ ∈ A (8)
Observe that (6) and (7) ensure that z encodes an allocation (in the same way
as (1) and (2) for x). The condition (8) then ensures that z is envy-free, since the
left-hand side is the total satisfaction of agent a and the right-hand side is the
total value of the bundle of a′ viewed via the utility function of agent a (i.e., the
satisfaction of a if she got the bundle of a′). It remains to bind z to (b3, b4).
∑
i∈I
ua(i) · z
a
i = b
a
3 ∀a ∈ A (9)
∑
a∈A
∑
i∈I
ua(i) · z
a
i = b4 (10)
Note that the left-hand side of (9) is exactly the right-hand side of (3) and
the same holds for (10) and (4). Consequently, we can replace the right-hand
sides of (3) and (4) with the right-hand sides of (9) and (10) while keeping their
meaning unchanged. The next lemma follows from the above discussion.
Lemma 1. Let Q ⊆ Qm+2mn+n+1 be a polyhedron defined by the conditions (5)–
(10). Then, (b, z) ∈ Q if and only if
– z is an envy-free allocation of the items described by m,
– b is the vector of right-hand sides of the conditions (1)–(4).
Using Proposition 2. In order to finish the proof of Theorem 1 we want to apply
Proposition 2 to the parametric ILP we constructed for a given instance I of
the EEF–Allocation problem. Note that in the presented model described
by (1)–(10), the dimension of x is m · n, where n is the number of agents in I
and m is the number of item types. It remains to estimate the parameter φ
(the maximum encoding length of a column in AI , the matrix of left-hand sides
in (1)–(4)). The columns of the matrix AI are vectors of length mn + 2m + 1;
thus, there are m(n+ 2) many delimiter symbols in their encoding. Recall that
each such column corresponds to an agent a and an item i. There are 2 ones (one
from condition (1) and one from (2)). Finally, there are 2 numbers both equal
to ua(i). Now, since we assumed ua(i) = 2
o(log |I|), we get φh(n) ≤ fˆ(n) · |I| by
Proposition 1. Now, applying Proposition 2 we either get that for every envy-
free allocation there exists one that dominates it or the sentence does not hold.
In the later case, we know that this means there is a Pareto-efficient envy-free
allocation. This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
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4 Conclusion
We described a somewhat new usage of Parametric ILPs in fixed dimension in
the design of parameterized algorithms, enabling to significantly improve a pre-
vious fixed-parameter tractability result. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to model (solve) the negation of a given instance to obtain a solution
to the original one. We hope that this approach might lead to new results in pa-
rameterized algorithms. Naturally, we would like to see many more applications
of PILP in algorithm design.
Remarkably, our approach can be used with numerous other problem variants
that aim at finding efficient fair allocations. Indeed, it turns out that our tech-
nique can be applied to the E-Efficient F-Allocation problem [11], which
is a more general variant of the EEF–Allocation where Pareto-efficiency is re-
placed by some efficiency notion E and envy-freeness is replaced by some fairness
notion F . More precisely, we can show fixed-parameter tractability for EEF–
Allocation parameterized by the number n of agents and the number m of
item types for various efficiency and fairness notions. Besides relaxed notions of
Pareto-efficiency (e.g., where one only cares about being dominated by similar
allocations) or relaxed envy-freeness such as EF1 [6,14,24] or EFX [14,25], this
includes also generalizations of these concepts such as group Pareto-efficiency [2]
or graph envy-freeness [12] or somewhat related fairness concepts such as Max-
iMinShare [13,26].
Summarizing, with our technique we can show that E-Efficient F-Allo-
cation is fixed-parameter tractable for n + m even if item multiplicities and
utilities are binary encoded when
– E is a combination of (graph/group) Pareto-efficiency, and
– F is a combination of (graph/group) EF, (graph) EF1, (graph) EFX, Maxi-
Min, or MaxiMinShare.
We refer to our previous work [11] on how to model these notions within the ILP
framework.
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